Due Process vs. Administrative Law by Barnett, Kent H
Digital Commons @ Georgia Law
Popular Media Faculty Scholarship
11-16-2015
Due Process vs. Administrative Law
Kent H. Barnett
University of Georgia School of Law, khbarn@uga.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Popular Media by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access
For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Repository Citation
Barnett, Kent H., "Due Process vs. Administrative Law" (2015). Popular Media. 230.
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/fac_pm/230
Due	Process	vs.	Administrative	Law	
By	Kent	Barnett	
Wall	Street	Journal	
16	November	2015	
The	Securities	and	Exchange	Commission	has	recently	come	under	fire	for	pressuring	its	in‐house	
administrative‐law	judges	to	rule	in	its	favor	during	agency	enforcement	proceedings.	These	are	
serious	charges	because	ALJs	are	guaranteed	independence	by	statute.	More	troubling,	but	largely	
overlooked,	are	the	judges	in	federal	regulatory	proceedings	who	lack	statutory	independence.	
They	have	many	titles,	including	hearing	officer,	appeals	officer	or	immigration	judge.	But	they	are	
often	collectively	referred	to	as	administrative	judges.	More	than	3,000	AJs	‐‐	approximately	double	
the	number	of	administrative‐law	judges	‐‐	work	in	numerous	federal	agencies,	including	the	IRS	
and	the	Equal	Employment	Opportunity	Commission.	
Administrative	judges	preside	over	trial‐like	hearings	that	award	or	deny	benefits	or	licenses,	
assess	penalties	for	regulatory	or	statutory	violations,	or	resolve	private	disputes.	Agencies	often	
appear	in	proceedings	opposite	the	parties	they	regulate.	
Significant	statutory	safeguards	exist	for	administrative‐law	judges.	Federal	regulatory	agencies	
appointing	one	must	choose	from	three	candidates	whom	another	independent	agency,	after	
administering	an	exam,	has	deemed	the	most	qualified.	ALJs	cannot	receive	bonuses	or	
performance	reviews	from	agencies.	They	cannot	report	to	enforcement	officials	and	generally	
cannot	speak	to	agency	officials	about	a	case	without	the	other	party	present.	Agencies	can	
discipline	or	remove	them	only	if	another	independent	agency	determines	that	"good	cause"	exists	
for	doing	so.	
Administrative	judges	are	an	entirely	different	matter.	Federal	agencies	can	appoint	their	own	AJs	
directly	and	reward	them	with	bonuses	after	agency‐led	performance	reviews.	Agency	officials	can	
discuss	matters	in	dispute	privately	with	them.	Nearly	all	AJs	lack	statutory	protection	against	
arbitrary	discipline	or	removal.	
Agency	control	over	AJs'	livelihoods	necessarily	creates	the	appearance	of	partiality.	As	the	
Supreme	Court	has	recognized	‐‐	most	recently	in	Free	Enterprise	Fund	v.	Public	Company	
Accounting	Oversight	Board	(2010)	‐‐	"one	who	holds	his	office	only	during	the	pleasure	of	another	
cannot	be	depended	upon	to	maintain	an	attitude	of	independence	against	the	latter's	will."	
Likewise,	the	Supreme	Court	emphasized	in	Caperton	v.	A.T.	Massey	Coal	(2009)	that	"fears	of	bias	
can	arise	when	.	.	.	a	man	chooses	the	judge	in	his	own	cause."	There,	the	court	required	a	justice	on	
West	Virginia's	Supreme	Court	of	Appeals	to	recuse	himself	from	a	case	in	which	a	significant	donor	
to	his	election	campaign	was	a	party.	
	
Whether	AJs	are	actually	biased,	or	agencies	sway	them,	is	not	the	issue.	Simply	the	appearance	of	
partiality	damages	due	process.	
Reform	is	necessary,	and	the	first	step	is	plain.	While	enforcement	proceedings	before	
administrative‐law	judges	are	imperfect	and	can	be	improved,	Congress	should	require	that	ALJs,	or	
AJs	with	substantially	similar	statutory	independence,	preside	over	all	agency	hearings.	Agencies	
should	move	to	ensure	the	same.	And	they	should	do	so	before	federal	courts	make	them.	
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